Kunqu derived from Suzhou, China's eastern coastal region and had been a popular music form across China (Xie and Wang 2005: 65, Ye 2013) . Despite Kunqu's wide popularity, it was the private Kunqu theatre that held the most distinction. By and large, the private Kunqu theatre belonged to the scholar-official elite class. The troupe of a private theatre was inclusively made of female performers, usually purchased from the ages of 6-7 into the family as semi-servants, who held an ambiguous status between performers and family concubines (Shen 2005) . The private performance was held in a pavilion which was erected above the water in the garden. Scholars would sit across the water, the rocks and water serving as natural amplifying systems. Here they would be sipping fresh tea and discussing with peer scholars their newly composed classic lyrics, sung by their favorite young female singer (Ye 2013 , Liu 2005 .
As private Kunqu theatre disapproved of any financial compensation, only a select few of the landowner scholar-official class could sustain such a millionaire hobby for long. The private Kunqu troupe owners, with few exceptions, were landed official-scholars with exceptional literary skills and substantial financial power (Shen 2005: 22) . Kunqu, as a leisure class way of life, together with the ownership, in particular the ownership of women and property, acted as evidence of gentility, marking the distinction of the historically elite Chinese scholar class.
Having dominated both private and popular markets for nearly 400 years, from the 1780s, Kunqu began to see rising competition from diverse regional popular opera forms, represented by Jingju or Beijing opera, appealing to mass consumers with vernacular speech, and adaptions with a focus on market entertainment (Li 2010 , Goldstein 2007 , Mackerras 1988 .
When challenged by newborn genres, Kunqu resisted popularization and continued to polish itself in classical lyrics and rhythmic music for the sophisticated taste of the literati. According to the early 19 th century commentator, Li Guangting, 'Kunqu was too refined to find listeners.
Over the past sixty years, it gradually lost its soul mates (from the market)' (Cited in Li 2010: 15) . Furthermore, following the loss of the UK-Sino opium wars in the 1840s and 1860s, and a series of international invasions, China's long-established superiority was shaken to the core. Meanwhile, new modern university institutions were established anchoring on the pursuit of 'science' and 'democracy'; modern scholar identity was underpinned by critical thinking and to lead the formation of a new China (Weston 2004: 6) . Such ambition was interrupted by both the Sino-Japanese War (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) and the Civil War 2. New scholar middle class searching for cultural distinction
The concept of 'middle class' is very much a Western discourse and scholars are still debating how to quantify Chinese middle class, as there has been an uneven formation of economic, social, cultural as well as political capital accounts. What scholars do agree on is that Chinese university graduates, with their high educational capital and potentially high economic earning power, are generally regarded as the backbone of the Chinese middle class (Hulme 2014 , Li 2010 , Goodman 1998 .
From 1978 to 2004, enrollment numbers in colleges and universities grew sharply, and the total nearly tripled from 1999 to 2003 (Yusuf and Kaoru 2006) . Regional governments designed competitive policies to attract new university graduates to settle in their respective regions, such as registration identity, house purchasing and welfare access, and groom them to be the pillar of regional social and economic growth (Chen 2013 : 60-61, Crabb 2010 , Liu 2008 . Despite high education and potential economic capitals, this new middle class displayed a general lack of cultural capital and associated cultural distinction (Andreas 2009 , Kraus 1989 .
Researchers have highlighted the emerging middle class conspicuous consumption behavior, focusing mainly on Western products and cultural goods, ranging from luxury international brands to Hollywood films (Tsai et al. 2013 , Henningsen 2012 , Zhu and Berry 2009 . Since the abolition of the Confucius examination in the early 20 th century, Kunqu faded to obscurity and diverse regional popular opera forms were criticized by modern scholars as a burden to
Chinese modernization and they have purposely distanced themselves from the art forms It is with the party-state 'central bank' resource, long term funding and policy development as support, that we begin to see new production and consumption patterns that changed the Chinese cultural landscape in the new millennium.
Although under the latest policy that all opera forms are considered 'elite culture', only
Kunqu is historically related to the scholar elite class; and it is Kunqu that has been identified by artists to experiment and to offer to the university students as the cultural identity that they were seeking. The following section examines the making of a new Kunqu art world through the case study of three Kunqu productions of The Peony Pavilion, produced consecutively between the late 1990s and mid-2010s. The reasons for selecting these three productions are not only because each production served as vital inspiration and reference point for the next artist's continued creativity and experimentation, key to the development of a new art world, but also as they highlight artists' different approach towards the CCP ideological direction, which resulted in different artistic outcomes. Only artists who support party-state ideological evolution, allowing access to 'central bank' capital in the forms of university curriculum, opera house and land use, may continue to experiment and innovate before a new audience taste is nurtured and turning the most obscure art form, Kunqu, to a new art world. (Melvin 1998: 20) . However, the production team were stopped at the airport by the Shanghai Cultural Bureau and the contract was annulled. According to the Shanghai Cultural Bureau, there were 'pornographic', 'superstitious' and 'feudalist' acts and the production was not Kunqu. To this, Dir. Chen replied that 'there should be more than one interpretation of Kunqu'. Chen reformed the cast in the USA, using mainly local performers, with lead actors invited independently from Mainland China. A year later The Peony Pavilion was staged at the New York Lincoln Centre (Swatek 2002 , Faison 1998 ). The reviews of Chen's production were highly controversial.
Whilst most audiences commented on the lead roles' excellent Kunqu singing and performing skills, many were critical of Chen's directing style and even regarded the production as a cultural betrayal: 'an invented traditional Eastern scene through the lens of Post-Colonialism' (Guo 2010: 10). Such fusion of elite and folk-art forms, with mixed class value and identity representation is exciting. Chen's imaginative artistic creativity would not have provoked such a reaction from Shanghai Cultural Bureau if his production was to have been staged within Mainland China, for throughout the 1990s many highly controversial and creative operatic pieces were produced which stretched audience appetite (Joy and Sherry 2004: 320-324 ).
However, with an attempt to access the party-state's 'central bank' capital, of the Shanghai Kunqu Company, performing such a fusion production for the first time on the international stage, amidst China's intensified cultural elitism as a national strategy of soft power in the late 1990s, was a direct challenge to CCP ideological direction and legitimacy. Chen's response of 'there should be more than one interpretation' to the party-state criticism is indeed correct from an artistic perspective, his innovation and determination to bring the production alive deserves admiration. Yet, without CCP approval, Chen was prevented from access to the partystate 'central bank' for any long-term investment, with no audience nurtured and no Kunqu world emerging. In fact, the New York Lincoln Centre was the only occasion that Chen staged his production.
Despite the outcome, the significance of Chen's production is that it inspired others to to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power.
The wealth or power must be in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence' (86). Bai in turn reminded the university students that to be a true elite scholar and to be able to move into the class of distinction it was not enough to have just a degree certificate and even potential material wealth. The knowledge and ability to imitate the historical scholar-official elite class way of life is the vital evidence required to qualify oneself within the class of distinction.
In a survey conducted in 2012 over one hundred thousand audience members had watched Bai's production, 70% were young people with degree level education and above (Wang 2012: 30) . By then, Kunqu had become a recognized class distinction associated with university students, with reference specifically related to historical scholar-official elite class once held cultural distinction.
It is important to emphasis here that Bai was only able to articulate such distinction through access to the party-state's 'central bank' as 'long-term investment' in the form of art institution and university funding. The collaboration with Suzhou Kunqu Opera House guaranteed that access to high caliber professional artists, costumes and other facilities, such as rehearsal space, were free of charge, whilst performing costs and theatre rental at universities were all covered by the state. As watching traditional opera had become credit bearing compulsory education across Chinese universities, the nurturing of new audience taste was guaranteed. The birth of a new Kunqu art world began to emerge when innovation was presented at a regular basis to nurture the new audiences in the unfamiliar conventions before they become the key aspect of the art world -the loyal consumers (Becker 1982: 64) .
Neither Chen nor Bai were commercially minded. Not because they did not want to be so, but the Kunqu market was at its bleakest at the turn of the new millennium. However, by the early 2010s the first generation of the university students turned scholar middle class began to mature. They were eager and able to consume Kunqu as their newly gained cultural distinction, and the artist to lead the establishment of a commercial world of Kunqu was Zhang Jun.
Mid-2010s, Kunqu Conspicuous Consumption as Middle Class Cultural Distinction
Back in 1996 Zhang Jun was selected as the lead role of Liu Mengmei in Dir. Chen Shizheng's
The Peony Pavilion. After over a year of rehearsals, just before setting off to New York, Zhang was told, by his home institution Shanghai Kunqu Company, that the performance was cancelled, with no explanation given. Zhang felt a strong sense of frustration and became eager to take his art life into his own hands and control his own destiny (private communication 27 th June 2015). Historically, Chinese opera was mostly produced and directed by the lead actor, although such practice ceased under Mao with the establishment of state opera institutionalization and centralization. In the post-Mao market reform era, many artists of regional opera forms set up personal studios but almost none survived (Ma 2015) and there was certainly no independent Kunqu studio in the 1990s. Zhang described the disastrous and humiliating experience when he performed the famous Kunqu The Peony Pavilion at Tongji University in the late 1990s, the very university that Bai debuted his production half a decade later:
'I remember that day very vividly. The night happened to be before the students' final examination.
No one was in the mood for watching Kunqu -something most students had never heard of and had no interest in anyway. The students were all anxious to leave and return to their revision. To prevent them from leaving the theatre, the university security locked all of the exit doors. Halfway through the performance, a student found a small hole on top of the theatre wall, one by one students climbed The Garden Version of The Peony Pavilion was to provide the audience a reinforced cultural distinction through the conspicuous consumption experience of historical elite class
Kunqu as a way of life, rather than Kunqu itself. The performing time was reduced from Dir.
Chen's 20hr long production and Dir. Bai's 9hr performance to just 70minutes (Insight China 2011: 105-107) . The audience sat across the lake facing the pavilion, as the historical elite scholar-official class once did. Highest quality acoustic systems were used to enhance the natural acoustic quality. Minute details were attended to, ensuring that the audience had maximized comfort and pleasure: special insect repellents with minimum odor were used and ice was stored under the seats to keep the atmosphere cool (Wang 2015, Zhang private communication 27 th June 2015). As we see from Figure 3 , ticket prices ranged from the lowest 50yuan 2 student price to 880yuan the highest. This was to ensure that students were still able to stand at the back of the seating areas to continue to have their Kunqu taste nurtured whilst the matured middle class consumers, with high disposable income with which to purchase such a conspicuous consumption experience, could occupy front row seats immediately across the water -just as the historical scholar-official elite class did in their private gardens. Whilst we applaud the establishment of a new Kunqu art world, I would like to remind readers of the origin of elite Kunqu: its rising popularity amongst scholar officials in the Ming dynasty (1366-1644) was associated with increased political persecution from the court. To have a garden and to be entertained by Kunqu was the way to retreat from the society they served, to escape from the political decay that they had no power to change (Du 2010: 128; Dong 2011: 235) . The 1989 Tiananmen Square student event was followed by a decade of authoritarian led economic drive. In the past 30 years, the world has witnessed China's economic rise, accompanied by the acceleration of class polarization and escalating social and political discontent (Ding & Yan 2005) . Although the new middle class has gained a degree of financial status and some intellectual autonomy, they hold limited political power and struggle with economic distinction. The common phrase to mock the middle class is in fact to refer to them as 'house slaves' (fangnu), for their struggle to own even a small flat in cosmopolitan cities. Still, intellectuals are increasingly judging the 1989 student activism in harsh terms (Weston 2004: 253) . The middle class support the CCP rather than being critical of the regime, as their distinction and legitimacy, although limited, are intimately tied with party-state policy support (Hulme 2014 , Chen 2013 , Goldman 2004 , Goodman 1998 .
Conclusion and Reflection
For the middle class, to imitate the historical elite class Kunqu taste in a garden for 70minutes provides them with temporary escape from political and economic reality and, for a short period at least, is to achieve fantasized legitimacy and distinction. To support artists to revive such fantasized historical scholar-official leisure class, through contemporary Kunqu conspicuous consumption, is a satisfactory outcome suiting CCP ideological evolution and 
